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Abstract 
A statutory minimum wage has been introduced in Germany, in the face of business 
opposition but abetted by union support. The political coalition in favour of minimum 
wage regulation brought together the centre-left and the centre-right with the argument 
that regulation is needed to prevent disfunctional interaction between low wages and the 
social security system. Thus the dualization which characterises Germany’s inegalitarian 
form of coordinated capitalism has provoked a corrective political response. The paper 
traces the long path to government intervention and  assesses why employers were 
unable, or unwilling, to pre-empt intervention by maintaining the coverage of collective 
bargaining. It is argued that market liberalization has had a paradoxical effect on 
employer power: intense domestic as well as international competition has reduced 
employers’ capacity to act strategically to fend off regulation by the government. 
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1. Introduction 
A number of commentators have traced the elements of continuity and change that have 
marked German political economy since unification. Dualization is a recurring theme: the 
labour market has become segmented between a high-wage industrial core and a low-
wage service sector periphery (Palier and Thelen 2010). Continuity in the core is 
emphasised: industrial relations at the level of large export sector firms maintain the high-
skill orientation that ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) identified as a key source of German 
comparative advantage (Hassel 2014). Thelen (2012) traces Germany’s ‘trajectory of 
liberalization’, showing that sector-level coordination has maintained the viability of the 
German VoC while producing inegalitarian outcomes compared with countries with 
stronger state capacities. 
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In keeping with the VoC approach, these accounts ‘put employer interests at the centre of 
the analysis’ (Hall and Thelen 2009: 11). As Hall and Thelen go on to explain, the 
centrality of employers’ interests stems from their structural power under capitalism: ‘the 
institutions and practices of capitalist political economies can rarely be sustained over 
time without the active support of at least some powerful segments of capital.’ This 
perspective suggests that the German trajectory of liberalization is stable: capitalism 
thrives, and a weak state cannot promote more egalitarian outcomes. 
 
The recent introduction of a statutory minimum wage (SMW) in Germany stands as a 
challenge to this view. It suggests that dualism, with an unregulated secondary labour 
market, may be economically robust but not politically sustainable. A key issue for 
successive governments was that the interaction between low wages and the social 
security system produced disfunctional outcomes. Low-paid workers did not earn enough 
to join the social insurance system; furthermore, they often needed top-ups from in-work 
benefits to reach a minimum living standard. A centrist political consensus gradually 
emerged that this situation had to be remedied by setting minimum wages, and when 
employers and unions proved unable to do this themselves, the government acted. The 
SMW introduced in January 2015 was set at €8.50 per hour, well below the European 
leader, France (€9.61), but high enough to have a significant impact. Such has been the 
rapidity of Germany’s move up the low pay league table (Carlin et al 2014: 92) that it is 
estimated that the SMW could be binding on more than 15% of the workforce.
1
 
 
The implication is that a stable political economy needs not only viable capitalism but 
also a sustainable relationship between work and welfare. This is not a new issue for 
Germany: adverse interactions between employment and social security were central to 
the travails of the 1990s, when the labour market parties externalised adjustment costs 
onto the social security system, particularly through the heavy use of early retirement 
schemes (Trampusch 2005). Attempts by successive governments to negotiate reforms 
with the labour market parties were only partly successful. In the early 2000s, the Hartz 
reforms to unemployment benefits and employment service administration were pushed 
through unilaterally by the government, which abandoned corporatist policy concertation 
and reduced employer and union influence over labour market policy. 
 
The Hartz reforms indicated that, despite continuity in sector-level corporatism, the 
macro politics of interactions between employers, unions and political parties in 
government had changed markedly since the heyday of German corporatism (Streeck and 
Hassel 2003). In its heyday, tripartite concertation resolved public policy problems that 
were beyond the capacities of Germany’s ‘semi-sovereign’ state to resolve (Katzenstein 
1987). Streeck (2003) gave a despairing account of the policy stasis that resulted when 
corporatist concertation failed in a weak state, but his account proved to have 
underestimated the capacity of coalitional politics to overcome decision-making 
blockages in the political system. 
 
                                                 
1
 Using 2011 data, Brenke and Müller (2013: Table 1) arrive at a figure of 17%. This is hedged with a 
number of caveats about the quality as well as the timeliness of the data.  
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This is not to claim that Germany has acquired the public sector capacities characteristic 
of egalitarian capitalism (Martin and Thelen 2007). A minimum wage is a minimal 
measure: employers have to accept a floor to wages, but otherwise enjoy considerable 
power and flexibility in wage-setting. They retain, of course, the structural power of exit: 
if the wage is too high, employment will decline. Nonetheless, the political agreement to 
intervene suggests that the VoC perspective gives an exaggerated account of the stability 
of Germany’s political economy. While trade unions stand accused of colluding with 
employers to defend insider interests in the domain of industrial relations (Hassel 2014), 
the unions have campaigned vigorously against dualism in political venues. They framed 
their campaign around the stress that low pay put on the welfare state, facilitating the 
formation of a broad political coalition of support. 
 
The discussion below shows that, because of intense domestic as well as international 
competition, employers failed to support repeated attempts by successive governments to 
raise the coverage of collective agreements and promote the ‘self-regulation’ of low pay. 
This suggests that market liberalization may have a paradoxical outcome: as employers’ 
market power is enhanced, their political influence declines, because competition 
between firms weakens employers’ associations and undermines their ability to act 
strategically in the face of political pressure.  
 
The discussion proceeds as follows. The next section traces the path to the SMW from 
the first steps taken by the government to facilitate self-regulation in the mid-1990s. 
Successive reforms were partly triggered by the obstructive tactics of the umbrella 
association of employers, the BDA. Section 3 takes the analysis of employers’ positions 
further, showing how both competitive pressure on the export sector and intensified 
competition within once-sheltered sectors impeded coordination and weakened 
employers’ capacity to pre-empt the threat of state intervention. Section 4 turns to the 
unions, and asks why their endorsement of the SMW became more wholehearted and less 
confined to the unions in the weakest bargaining position during the 2000s. Their 
political opportunities and capacities increased in the 2000s relative to their diminishing 
industrial strength. The political environment in its turn became more receptive because 
of the emerging problem of low pay linked to welfare reform (section 5). Finally, I offer 
some brief concluding reflections on what the case shows about how the political 
influence of employers is affected by market liberalization and the intensification of 
competition. 
 
 
2. The path to the statutory minimum wage: A brief legislative history 
The reluctance of governments of any political hue to intervene directly in wage-fixing in 
Germany is indicated by numerous reforms undertaken since the mid-1990s to sustain the 
coverage of collective agreements in the face of competitive pressures. These pressures 
arose first from the opening of the European single market to cross-border competition 
through the ‘posting’ of workers employed under terms and conditions prevailing in 
another member state. Construction, traditionally at the heart of the ‘sheltered’ sector, 
was the first area to be affected. Subsequently, competitive pressure has also extended 
into the services sector due to employment deregulation, which has allowed the increased 
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use of temporary agency workers and extension of outsourcing. Public sector reforms, 
such as the breakup of the postal service monopoly and the introduction of competitive 
contracting in some public services, have further intensified domestic competition. 
 
In the 1990s, construction firms from other member states sought a slice of Germany’s 
post-unification building boom, and they were highly competitive, as they could bring in 
posted workers from states where prevailing wages were significantly lower. Rulings by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed that these firms were validly 
exercising the freedom to provide services in the internal market, and indicated that host 
states could insist only on compliance with minimum wages and working conditions 
which applied uniformly across the sector in question.   
 
The Posted Workers Act (Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz 1996, the PWA) created a 
framework within which unions and employers in the construction sector could conclude 
a collective agreement which could then be made generally applicable to all construction 
activity on German soil. The Act as first passed envisaged that the process of universal 
application would be conducted according to the terms of the law on collective 
bargaining (the Tarifvertragsgesetz, TVG, section 5). Under this procedure (called 
‘Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung’, AVE), employers who were not parties to the original 
agreement could be bound under certain conditions, notably that the employer and union 
sides agree that an extension would be in the public interest. A council of representatives 
of the peak organisations of business and labour, the ‘Tarifausschuss’, hears submissions 
from the parties and makes a (consensual) recommendation to the government (Heitzler 
and Wey 2010: 20).  
 
It was clear from the start of the legislative process that the peak association of 
employers, the BDA, was opposed to making collective agreements universally 
applicable in the construction sector. The BDA expressed concern that relatively high 
construction sector wages would spill over into wage pressure on other sectors, and it also 
noted that the burden of high construction costs was borne by other branches of industry, 
and could dampen investment and employment. For their part, construction industry 
employers favoured making and extending an agreement. However, the BDA enjoyed an 
effective veto in the Tarifausschuss. The first attempt by the construction industry to 
achieve universal application under the new Act failed because of this. The industry was 
forced to open a second round of negotiations with the unions. A lower minimum wage 
was agreed, and this gained the assent of the BDA (Menz 2001/2). 
 
In 1998 the Red-Green government reformed the PWA to remove the BDA’s veto power. 
By making an executive order (Rechtsverordnung, RVO), the Ministry of Labour could 
extend agreements without the unanimous support of the Tarifausschuss. The previous 
AVE procedure also remained in place: thus the parties seeking to extend a collective 
agreement could make a choice about which mechanism to use. In 1999, a new 
construction industry agreement was made. The parties initially sought the approval of 
the Tarifausschuss, but again the BDA blocked the measure. This time, the sector parties 
turned to the state, and the agreement was extended by executive order. 
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In the 2000s, this process became dominant: the government, rather than the peak 
associations represented in the Tarifausschuss, imposed universal application. 
Furthermore, other reforms to the Act expanded the sectors covered, including some 
where competition between domestic firms rather than the presence of posted workers 
was at issue. Thus the PWA was ‘increasingly used to regulate wage competition 
internally.’ (Grimshaw et al 2014: 486). Heitzler and Wey (2010: 20) claim that ‘the 
Act’s main purpose has become to enforce minimum wages in several service sectors on 
domestic firms.’ But of course the distinction between domestic and cross-border 
competition cannot necessarily be made clearly. The preamble of the PWA states that it is 
intended to regulate cross-border work, but also to regulate competition more generally 
and to maintain the collective bargaining system. The text of the recent executive order in 
meat processing (see below) draws attention to the presence of posted workers from 
abroad in the sector, and also to the employment of women at very low wages. In short, a 
boundary between regulating migrants and regulating internal competition was not 
established. 
 
While constraints on the sectoral coverage of the PWA were eased and procedural issues 
addressed in successive reforms, its efficacy in establishing sectoral minimum wages had 
limitations that could not be surmounted by legislation. Some low-wage sectors had no 
Germany-wide agreement eligible for extension, while others had several agreements 
made with competing unions, including agreements of doubtful validity under the TVG. 
One consequence was that there were often severe delays in making agreements 
universally applicable. As section 4 below explains in more detail, these conflicts and 
delays were a factor in drawing the unions towards support for a single SMW, where the 
stronger unions had previously favoured extension of collective agreements.  
 
In the 2005 election campaign, the SPD declared that it would introduce a statutory 
minimum wage if the trade unions and employers could not agree minima for all sectors, 
while the CDU/CSU affirmed its commitment to securing minimum conditions sector by 
sector through collective bargaining augmented by universal application. The Grand 
Coalition of 2005-9 initiated reforms intended to make the sectoral alternative work, 
including addressing problems caused by conflicting collective agreements. It also 
pursued another route. Under the 1952 Minimum Working Conditions Act, a committee 
could investigate whether a minimum wage was required when no collective agreement 
was in place. In 2007, the government reformed this Act to give the Federal Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs a larger role, over the objections of employers and some 
unions (Thelen 2014: 56).  
 
The right-wing coalition of Christian Democrats and the market-liberal FDP (2009-13) 
did not take further steps: the FDP stood out in opposition to universal application and 
other regulatory interventions, insisting that these would cost jobs. When another Grand 
Coalition was formed in 2013, the CDU/CSU finally conceded the SMW in the coalition 
agreement. However, the history of attempts at self-regulation left its mark on the 
legislation, which is, somewhat paradoxically, entitled ‘Law to strengthen collective 
bargaining’ (Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz). Reforms to extension procedures are 
included in the legislation, and the Posted Workers Act is no longer confined to specified 
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sectors. Furthermore, the government’s reluctance to override agreements in force means 
that the application of the statutory minimum has been delayed in some sectors, until 
current agreements run out. Given the difficulties that the unions have had in concluding 
collective agreements, there must have been some chagrin at the surge in agreements 
concluded in 2012-14, as the risk that there would be a SMW became clear. Particularly 
notable was the agreement made in the meat processing sector, one of the industries most 
notorious for low pay, long hours and poor conditions. The agreement was made in 
January 2014, and extended by government order in March 2014.
2
 
 
 
3. Employers’ preferences and strategies 
 
The conflict documented above, between construction industry employers and the BDA 
over the regulation of posted workers, gives a preliminary indication of how employers’ 
interests in wage regulation are divided. The reason for employers in the construction 
industry to support universal application of their collective agreement was evident: it 
would protect the industry from external low-wage competition. For industries which 
purchase goods and services from the protected sector, the effect is to inflate their costs. 
The outcome of this conflict of interest among employers depends on the intensity of 
purchasing firms’ deregulatory preferences and their ability to pursue those preferences in 
the wage-fixing process.  As Afonso (2011: 707) showed, this ability depends on the 
aggregation of preferences by employers’ associations, as well as on the strategic 
interactions between employers, organised labour and the state. In this section I show 
that, not only did the BDA tend to side with the export sector, but also the coordinative 
capacity of employers generally fell, reducing their capacity to take a strategic approach 
to interactions with organised labour and the state. 
 
The export sector in Germany has displayed intense deregulatory preferences. Faced with 
the erosion of competitive advantage due to innovation and lower costs in other countries, 
German industry has relied on aggressive cost-cutting and outsourcing to maintain its 
competitiveness. Outsourcing has been more heavily used than in (for example) the 
Nordic countries, and it gives German firms a competitive edge that is not revealed by 
direct wage comparisons (Dustmann et al 2014; Carlin et al 2014: 84-5). Firms under 
competitive pressure reached agreements with their core workforces on cost-cutting 
measures involving subcontracting peripheral services, thereby driving wages down in 
those sectors (Palier and Thelen 2010).  Divisions among employers over wage 
bargaining policy became apparent. One important division was between large firms and 
their smaller suppliers in the export sector. Hassel (2007a: 260-1) documents how large 
firms were better able to bear wage increases than small ones, due to their greater ability 
to reorganise production to achieve productivity gains. Large firms were also better 
equipped than small firms to externalise adjustment costs onto the social insurance 
system, particularly through the use of early retirement. One consequence was that 
smaller firms removed themselves from coverage by collective agreements: the share of 
employees covered in the metal sector fell from more than 75% in the 1970s and 1980s to 
55% in the mid-2000s. 
                                                 
2
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To avoid coverage, firms had to leave the relevant sectoral employers’ association. 
Associations responded by trying to attract members back on different terms: specifically, 
by offering the opportunity to belong without signing up to the collective agreement 
(membership ‘ohne Tarif’). While this stemmed the flow, it also pointed to a loss of 
capacity on the part of the associations. As Hall and Thelen (2009: 19) observed, 
employer defections reduced bargaining coverage, and ‘seriously compromised 
coordination in industrial relations despite the fact that the formal institutional apparatus 
for negotiation itself remains intact.’ Specifically, it meant that associations lacked the 
capacity to take up the government’s invitations to establish minimum wages.  
 
The cleaning sector provides an example where some employers favoured making a 
collective agreement to regulate competition and thereby limit low pay. For this to work, 
universal application was critical. As noted above, the blocking tactics of the BDA in the 
Tarifausschuss were a barrier to universal application (Bosch and Weinkopf 2008: 309). 
An amendment to the PWA in 2008 brought the cleaning industry under the executive 
order (RVO) procedure, where the BDA did not have a veto, and in 2010 a collective 
agreement was made and extended (Bosch and Weinkopf 2010: 20). However, the 
employers’ association in the cleaning sector supported a national SMW rather than an 
extended collective agreement for the cleaning sector. The key reason was that the 
sectoral agreement covered cleaning companies, but not employers in other sectors who 
may have employees ‘in house’ doing cleaning jobs (Bosch and Weinkopf 2010: 30). 
Minimum wages with sectoral coverage did not regulate competition between in-house 
and external providers.  
 
A different set of problems marked the regulation of wages in the postal service, where 
the high-wage incumbent sought to use a sectoral wage agreement to prevent entry by 
low-wage competitors. The letter market was opened up to competition in 2008, sparking 
concerns that new entrants would undermine wages in the sector. In mid-2007, the Grand 
Coalition agreed in principle to add postal services to the sectors covered by the Posted 
Workers Act. The main employer, Deutsche Post, established a Postal Employers 
Association, and moved quickly to reach a collective agreement with the service sector 
union Verdi (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft; the united services union). 
Legislation amending the Posted Workers Act was passed, and, proceeding expeditiously 
for once, the Federal Ministry of Labour declared the agreement generally binding.  
 
Prospective competitors responded to the Deutsche Post-Verdi agreement by establishing 
their own employers’ association and reaching an agreement with a newly-formed union. 
The competitors’ association challenged the minimum wage established by the Federal 
Ministry in court, claiming that their own agreement should be recognised. This claim 
was initially successful: the court ruled that a minimum wage could only be imposed on 
employers and workers not bound by any agreement. However, another court decision 
established that the new union was not ‘tariff enabled’ and the competitors’ collective 
agreement was not valid. An appeal from the first ruling held that the decision on 
universal application had not been made correctly by the Ministry, as it had failed to give 
the other parties an opportunity to comment (Heitzler and Wey 2010). This example 
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illustrates how employer divisions could impede the establishment of sectoral minimum 
wages. These divisions arose when competition intensified, whether because new entrants 
sought market share or because incumbents preferred to compete without constraints on 
wages and the organisation of work (for a discussion of the latter situation in the retail 
sector, see Thelen 2014: 53.)  
 
The original idea of the PWA was that German employers could reach agreements to 
protect themselves from competition from cross-border providers. The prospect for 
agreement might be thought to be high in such conditions, since the competitive threat 
came from firms that were not members of German employer associations. However, 
intensified competition between domestic firms impeded agreement. Section 2 outlined 
how the preferences of the export sector against the limitation of domestic competition 
were reflected in the resistance of the BDA to universal application. But even after the 
blocking power of the BDA was reduced, intense competition among German firms in 
supposedly sheltered sectors stymied agreements. The balance might have been tipped in 
a regulatory direction if unions had been able to impose substantial pressure on 
employers to make industry-wide agreements. But the opposite happened: faced with 
high employer resistance and local pressure to save jobs, unions accepted more 
decentralised bargaining, with implications that are discussed further in the next section. 
 
 
4. The unions’ change of heart 
 
In the course of the 2000s, the idea of setting a single statutory minimum wage gradually 
attracted the support of the majority of unions in the umbrella association, the DGB. The 
campaign was initiated by  the Food and Catering Workers Union (Gewerkschaft 
Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststaetten, NGG), which struggled with low membership, high 
casualisation, and employer resistance to negotiation. The support of other unions, 
notably Verdi and then IG Metall, came as the coverage of collective agreements 
declined and bargaining became increasingly decentralised. This section traces the spread 
of decentralisation and explains why the SMW was eventually embraced as a response. 
 
Many accounts of German unions from the 1990s and early 2000s emphasise their 
investment in corporatist institutions and attachment to strategies of externalising costs 
onto the social insurance system. This has led to vigorous criticism of their role in 
defending ‘insider’ interests (Palier and Thelen 2010). Hassel (2007b) described the 
established unions’ failure to recruit new members as ‘the curse of institutional security’. 
DGB unions defended their institutional monopolies against new entrants (although with 
diminishing success – see Hassel 2007b: 188-9), and failed to find new members among 
younger workers and women, who have been severely under-represented (Häusermann 
2010: 228). 
 
To some extent, these criticisms highlight known weaknesses in the capacity of German 
unions to defend the interests of the working class as a whole. The sectoral basis of 
bargaining always meant that there was limited ‘solidarity’ in the Swedish sense, 
whereby wage settlements for workers with less industrial power caught up with the well-
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organised leaders. So long as demand conditions were sufficiently accommodating and 
unemployment was low, wages in the less organised parts of the service sector held up, 
but ‘German trade unions were not strong enough and not sufficiently centralized to 
pursue a solidaristic wage policy that would have led to lasting reductions in pay 
differentials.’ Despite some success in reducing regional differences and extending 
‘pacesetter’ gains to weaker sectors, ‘[t]here remained considerable differences.. between 
the core industries in the export sector .. and many consumer and social services 
[agreements].. [T]he traditional German model was always vulnerable to a widening of 
wage differentials.’ (Bosch and Weinkopf  2008: 294).  
 
This vulnerability became evident after the shock of reunification and the intensification 
of service sector competition in the 1990s. National unions struggled with pressures for 
local concession bargaining to save jobs. IG Metall had to give way on allowing local 
derogations from collective bargains, regularising these in the Pforzheim agreement 
(Carlin et al 2014). While the agreement was meant to regularise derogations and 
improve the union’s control over them, in practice it found itself rubber-stamping the 
agreements of local works councils. Works councils played a leading role in cooperating 
with employers to bring about the reorganisation of production to save jobs, including 
accepting the extension of outsourcing and use of temporary agency workers. Palier and 
Thelen (2010: 126) remark that ‘structures.. to enhance labor’s voice at the plant level 
ironically provided ideal vehicles for fuelling trends towards dualism when economic 
hard times hit.’ 
 
Under pressure in wage bargaining, national unions sought ‘revitalisation’ by adopting 
political strategies. IG Metall faced a battle in the court of public opinion, as the 
employers’ association, Gesamtmetall, ran a public campaign against the ‘inflexibility’ of 
German labour relations (Haipeter 2011). Metall responded with  local engagement to try 
to restrain concessions, a membership drive, and a higher public profile, particularly in 
campaigning against the Hartz reforms. Another union that explicitly sought revitalisation 
was Verdi, which was formed in 2001 by a merger of five service sector unions. Its base 
was in the public sector, and it undertook a membership drive to bring in workers in 
private service sectors, including providers of contracted-out public services, as well as 
increasing the number of women members. Particularly important for the minimum wage 
campaign was Verdi’s increased engagement in political as well as industrial action, 
linking to other ‘social movement’ campaigns. Verdi’s political capacity increased as a 
result of the merger of constituent unions (Annesley 2006). 
 
Verdi and IG Metall were leading critics of the Hartz reforms; in particular of the more 
stringent job acceptance requirements imposed on long-term unemployed workers in 
Hartz IV. Tighter work-testing meant downward pressure on wages: long term benefit 
recipients could not turn down jobs on the grounds that wages were lower than 
collectively bargained rates. Unions objected to this measure, which they saw as pulling 
away the wage floor provided by the welfare state. In response, SPD President 
Müntefering suggested that a statutory minimum wage could mitigate the effects; 
however, he insisted that this would have to be agreed and supported by the unions before 
the SPD would take the idea forward (Bispinck 2005: 22). Müntefering’s offer can be 
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seen as a challenge: unions claimed that their opposition to the Hartz reforms stemmed 
from their concern about the welfare of the worst-off and the lowest-paid, but how far did 
this go? A SMW would primarily benefit workers who did not belong to unions. 
Häusermann (2010) has argued that, when presented with policies responding to 
‘postindustrial’ societal change, German unions retreated to protection of their core 
members’ interests, causing a widening rift between the unions and the SPD. 
 
When the unions debated the minimum wage in response to Müntefering’s challenge in 
2004, three options were supported by different unions. IG-BAU, the construction union 
and pioneer of universal application under the Posted Workers Act, favoured more use of 
that mechanism. IG Metall supported the revival of the 1952 Minimum Working 
Conditions Act, which had more potential to address situations where there was no 
collective agreement in place. And a third group of unions, led by NGG and Verdi, 
argued for a SMW (Bispinck 2005).  
 
The preference of many unions for building a minimum wage on universal application of 
collective agreements can be readily explained. The system retains the unions’ central 
role in negotiating wages, whereas the level of a SMW would be set by the government. 
The argument is summed up by Laux (2005: 3): ‘[I]t may be a severe mistake to demand 
statutory minimum wages and hand this over to a most conservative-liberal 
government..[which] can implement its own aims’ - presumably setting a very low 
minimum wage, just above subsistence level. The sectoral approach would build on 
existing bargaining structures; bargaining autonomy would be retained but at the same 
time a minimum level of remuneration would be guaranteed by law. 
 
The change of view that was evident by 2006, when the DGB general conference voted 
overwhelmingly to support a SMW, can be seen as a sign of the weakness of the unions: 
reservations about the state’s role were outweighed by the need to countervail employer 
power by whatever means, political or industrial, were available. But there were also 
more positive aspects. The minimum wage was a popular cause with the public, avoiding 
the taint of special interest that had come to mark public attitudes to the unions in 
Germany. Public perceptions of the unions improved markedly in the 2000s: more than 
40% held a ‘positive’ view of trade unions in 2012, against 20% who were negative. In 
2003, just 23% had been positive; 45% had held a negative view (Bispinck and Schulten 
2014: 8).  
 
While the DGB endorsed the principle of a national SMW in 2006, unions remained 
ambivalent and divided, as did members of the SPD (Dostal 2012). As noted in section 2, 
the 2005-09 Grand Coalition took up the alternatives endorsed by IG-BAU and Metall 
respectively, of more extensive use of the posted workers procedure and revival of the 
1952 Act. But there were difficulties and delays in establishing sectoral minimum wages 
in that way, which lent support to the argument that a single statutory minimum wage 
was the most viable policy. 
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5. The minimum wage in the welfare state  
The union-led campaign for a minimum wage was supported by favourable public 
opinion
3
 and a degree of cross-party support in principle, but this hid important 
reservations about the level at which the wage should be set. Both centrist parties had a 
similar initial reaction to the union campaign, which started in 2006 with a bid for a 
SMW of €7.50. Some members of the SPD backed a counterproposal for a SMW of 
€6.00, and CDU/CSU politicians who were prepared to countenance statutory 
intervention also declared for the lower rate. This section examines how the debate 
evolved to achieve political acceptance of the principle on which the initial bid of €7.50 
(revised to €8.50 in 2010) was based. The principle was that the minimum wage should 
be set such that a single person working full-time would earn enough not to require 
additional support from social assistance.
4
 The SMW was framed as a measure to 
regulate the subsidisation of low pay by the welfare state, a frame that drew in a wide 
range of political interests. 
 
If we were able to assume that the centre-left SPD is aligned with the unions, and the 
centre-right CDU with the employers, then it would be easy to read off political support 
for the minimum wage from each party’s producer group affiliation. However, these 
affiliations were far from secure. The SPD had embraced employment-promoting 
activation in the Hartz reforms, against union opposition. Provisions allowing the 
rejection of low-paid work were removed, and benefit recipients were encouraged to take 
up whatever work was available by a more permissive approach to combining work with 
benefit receipt, creating a work incentive by allowing some earnings to be disregarded 
(Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein 2007). This ‘combi-wage’ model was advocated by 
economists as a way of promoting employment while using the benefit system to secure 
basic living standards.
5
 The CDU-CSU also supported activation and the combi-wage 
approach. So long as the parties held to this view, they might support the principle of a 
SMW, but neither would endorse the level advocated by the unions. 
 
However, support for combi-wages was not secure in either party. Dissent emerged first 
in the SPD, where supporters of the Hartz reforms were gradually eclipsed by those who 
sought a new direction to revive the party’s flagging electoral fortunes (Dostal 2012: 106-
8). The SPD’s 2009 manifesto proposed to restrict the scope of combi-wages by 
introducing a minimum wage rate that would be enough for a single full-time worker to 
live on. It envisaged a ‘fundamental reorganization of the lower income range’, with the 
SMW as the ‘anchor’ (SPD 2009: 33). The 2013 SPD manifesto was still more explicit in 
rejecting the low-wage road to job creation that had been taken since the early 2000s. 
While ‘Agenda 2010’ (the umbrella term for the Hartz reforms) was defended as having 
got hundreds of thousands of people off social assistance, the manifesto admitted that in 
                                                 
3
 Die Zeit (‘Auf der Suche nach der armen Friseurin’, 10 July 2014) cited a survey by ARD-
Deutschlandtrend which found more than 90% of respondents favoured the introduction of the SMW. 
(http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2014-07/friseur-mindestlohn-bezahlung) 
4
 This calculation was rather approximate, as the social assistance level comprises a base amount and a rent 
allowance which varies from place to place.  
5
 The model seems to have originated in proposals from the IFO Institute in 2002; it was then embraced by 
other parts of Germany’s economic technocracy, including the Council of Economic Experts. See 
http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/Aktuelles-Stichwort/Topical-Terms-Archive/Kombilohn.html 
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the process it also created abuse of temporary work, mini-jobs and low-waged 
employment. The goal of SPD policy would henceforth be ‘to make people independent 
of transfers and provide access to good, secure and socially insured work’ (SPD 2013: 
19). 
 
The CDU/CSU stuck with the model of subsidised activation for longer. In its manifesto 
for the 2009 election campaign, it argued that everyone should have the minimum for a 
decent life, but a minimum wage would not ensure this: a combination of fair wages and 
additional state benefits might be needed. The key thing was that people should be better 
off in work than out of it (CDU/CSU 2009: 29). But this was by no means a comfortable 
or ‘natural’ position for the party. It embraced a conservative concept of social 
citizenship and was resistant to aggressive liberalization (Fleckenstein 2012; Jackson and 
Sorge 2012: s.3.2). The concept of social citizenship encompasses, alongside social 
insurance, principles of fair wages and regulated competition. Specifically, the party 
strongly endorsed the principle that all workers should be covered by collective 
agreements.  
 
By the 2013 election, the CDU/CSU had shifted ground on combi-wages. The explicit 
defence of combining work and benefits that had been advanced in 2009 disappeared. 
Temporary work, mini-jobs and part-time employment were still defended as providing 
necessary flexibility, but the possibility of abuse was also acknowledged, and the need to 
ensure decent wages accepted. While the CDU/CSU persisted in its view that politicians 
should not determine wages, further initiatives to strengthen self-regulatory processes 
were floated. A new plan for union-employer commissions to set minimum wages in 
sectors where no collective bargain was in place featured in the 2013 manifesto, despite 
some internal dissent (Peel 2011; CDU/CSU 2013: 7). 
 
A key feature of German political economy, which helps to explain the resonance of 
establishing a minimum wage that would reduce reliance on social assistance, is the 
strong preference for insurance-based social entitlements, which are at the heart of the 
German welfare state. Even before the Hartz reforms, employment-promoting measures 
had increased the number of people working in jobs that did not bring social insurance 
cover. The high cost of social insurance contributions was seen as a barrier to job 
creation, and exemptions were created, notably the institution of the ‘mini-job’6 where 
low pay was pervasive. Critics argued that the adoption of measures to ‘make work pay’ 
through combi-wages in the Hartz reforms worsened this problem, creating a vicious 
circle of fiscal pressure on social insurance and over-use of social assistance. As the 
number of recipients of combi-wages increased, reaching some 1.4m in 2010, the policy 
was increasingly seem as a cause of Germany’s low pay problem rather than a solution 
(Eichhorst 2015: 63). ‘Activation policies turned out to be a major programme for 
subsidizing low-skilled employment’ (Hassel 2014: 67). The framing of the SMW built 
on opposition to the Hartz reforms and resistance to the emergence of a second-class 
welfare status for workers who could not establish an insurance record.  
 
                                                 
6
 ‘Minijobs’ have monthly earnings below the threshold for contributing to social insurance (currently 
€450). 
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It would be misleading to suggest that social security issues were the only motives for 
eventual cross-party agreement on a SMW. Other factors did play a part: public opinion 
was influenced by media reports of egregious low pay, and also the case for better 
regulation of the wages of posted workers attracted support from across the political 
spectrum. The desire to regulate competition from service contractors based in other 
countries drew out support from CDU and CSU politicians at the state level, as the SMW 
provided a straightforward way to insist on minimum wages in public contracts.  
 
The diverse motives for eventual agreement are reflected in the preamble to the Act, 
which bridges the positions of the parties by specifying both the regulation of competition 
and the welfare anchor as motives for the measure. It stated the objectives as being to 
protect workers against unreasonably low wages, to ensure that competition between 
firms is based on better quality and service and not done at the expense of ever lower 
wages for workers, and to remove the incentive for firms to undercut wages while relying 
on ‘top-ups’ from social assistance. Thus ‘the minimum wage will protect the financial 
stability of the social security system’ (Deutscher Bundestag 2014a: 2). 
 
While mixed motives were in play, the implications of low pay for the welfare state were 
of particular significance. The focus on social assistance formed the basis for agreement 
on the level, not just the principle, of a SMW. A related campaign advocated that the 
minimum wage should be tax-free, linking it to the existenzminimum which is recognised 
in the tax system.
7
 Furthermore, concerns about ‘the financial stability of the social 
security system’ founded a public interest case for statutory intervention, whereas the 
labour market parties might be expected to reach autonomous agreements on the 
regulation of competition.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
While this account of the adoption of a SMW builds on features of Germany’s changing 
political economy that have been traced and analysed in an abundant literature, it casts a 
new light on the trajectory of liberalization. It suggests that it is wrong to see dualization 
as a stable outcome of the intensified competition and liberalization that has occurred in 
the German economy since unification. Instead, it appears that dualization creates its own 
pressures for further change. The unions’ redeployment of their resources into political 
campaigning, and the government’s own concerns for the viability of the welfare state, 
led eventually to the SMW. 
 
The account given here has emphasised the apparent loss of self-regulatory capacity on 
the part of employers, which has led to statutory intervention. We might see this as 
indicating a loss of influence on the part of employers in the political domain, but two 
other interpretations are possible. One is that the SMW will revitalise social partnership, 
as it brings the parties together in the commission that will set minimum wages in the 
                                                 
7
 The existenzminimum defines the personal allowance for income tax (although social insurance is payable 
at lower income levels). It is currently (in 2015) below the income level of a full-time minimum wage 
earner, who does therefore pay some income tax. There is a campaign to raise the personal allowance and 
ensure that minimum wage work is tax-free. 
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future: the Mindestlohnkommission. This institution can overcome the competitive 
barriers that have impeded sector-level agreements. The other interpretation is that 
employers have deliberately brought about the demise of corporatist concertation because 
they see the alternative of unilateral government action as likely to be more beneficial to 
them.  
 
The notion that the Mindestlohnkommission will be a venue for future social partnership 
has been actively promoted politically, particularly by CDU/CSU parliamentarians, but 
also by the SPD Minister of Labour, Andrea Nahles, who described the commission at its 
launch as an instance of ‘the vibrant social partnership in Germany’, and claimed that the 
employers’ and unions’ equal representation on the Commission would be a basis for 
cooperation that goes beyond collective bargaining.
8
 In the Bundestag, it was insisted 
that, the government having taken the initial step, the future was in the hands of the social 
partners. One reason to think that they might embrace the new institution is that both the 
DGB and the BDA have been weakened by membership losses, and the Commission will 
allow them to promote their organisational interest in having a role in policy-making.  
 
Against this, however, there is widespread pessimism that the two sides will be able to 
agree on future adjustments to the SMW, leaving the chair, which will rotate between 
employers and unions, with the casting vote. Anticipating that this will make settlements 
volatile and unpredictable, the BDA has canvassed the possibility that the parties might 
simply agree to index the SMW to the prevailing level of wage increases. This ‘passive’ 
strategy drew criticism in the Bundestag, where it was pointed out that it would abrogate 
the responsibility of the social partners to deliberate and formulate considered agreements 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2014b: 3326 (Zimmer)). It seems quite likely that the trade unions 
and employers will fail to live up to the hopes pinned on them by CDU/CSU politicians. 
 
What of the contrary view, that employers have, in failing to self-regulate, deliberately 
exploited their ‘power of inaction’? Without collective agreements, they are able to make 
individual contracts, and are freed from the constraints on their ‘right to manage’ 
imposed by union bargaining. Obviously, this carries the risk that the government will 
intervene in pursuit of its own public policy objectives, imposing regulations that are 
more detrimental than those that could have been agreed with the unions, but if 
employers believe that they exercise a high degree of political influence outside the 
framework of tripartite concertation, this risk will be assessed as slight.  
 
Does the introduction of the SMW show this calculation to be wrong? Arguably, the 
SMW imposes a minimal burden on business and may even reduce the workplace 
influence of trade unions because workers feel less need to join. However, this has not 
been the tenor of employers’ public response to the measure, which has been very hostile. 
Furthermore, the case suggests that the balance of relative political influence of 
employers and unions in an open political contest may not be advantageous to employers. 
The unions conducted an effective political campaign, and also promoted a frame of 
wage adequacy relative to social assistance that was more effective in a political venue 
than it would have been in bilateral bargaining with employers. 
                                                 
8
 http://www.bmas.de/DE/Service/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/milo-kommission-erste-sitzung.html 
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We are left, then, with the likelihood that the outcome is not the result of strategic 
calculation by employers, but rather reflects their loss of strategic capacity. Changes that 
have enhanced employers’ labour market power have at the same time reduced their 
political influence. Favourable outcomes in the domain of industrial relations have not 
extended to the domain of ‘macrocorporatist’ interaction between employers, unions and 
governments over public policy. The adoption of a minimum wage in Germany is a 
reminder that political economy has to pay attention to developments at the political level 
as well as tracing the evolution of competitive advantage in firms and sectors.  
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